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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
E\"""A EISNER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal
Corporation,
Defendant, Third-Party
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.LEO BONNERU,
Third-Party Defendant
and Respondent.

Case No. 7675

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT LEO BONNERU
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Third-party defendant accepts the Statement of
Facts as set forth in the brief of defendant, Salt Lake
City, with the following exceptions and additions:
Third-party defendant, Leo Bonneru, took out a
permit to install a sewer line at about 125 West 3rd
South, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 18). It was stipulated
that the work that was done at that location was pursuant to that permit. Further, the work that was done
· pursuant to that permit was completed on October 9,
1948. (R. 75, 76, 18, 19).
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It was stipulated at the pre-trial that defendant
Salt Lake City on October 21, 1948, excavated a hole for
the purpose of installing a water valve and meter and
ins talled a water valve and meter on 3rd South Street
near 125 West 3rd South in an area 6' x 8' and that said
area included the location of the sewer excavation made.
by third-party defendant Leo Bonneru. (R. 18, 19).
There was some confusion as to the exact location of the
hole into which plaintiff claims she fell. However, her
testimony at the trial placed the location of the hole one
foot east of the water meter locruted at that point. (R. 58,
61-67 inclusive).
At the close· of the plaintiff's testimony, third-party
defendant made the motion that the court dismiss the
action as to said third-party defendant with prejudice
on the ground that no competent evidence had been offered and received upon which the jury and the court
could return. a verdict against third-party defendant.
(R. 78).
Also, third-party defendant made the motion that
the court direct a verdict of no cause of action in favor
of the third-party defendant and agains1t the plaintiff,
Eva Eisner, and defendant, Salt Lake City, for the
reason that no competent evidence had been offered and
received from which the court or jury could return a
verdict against said third-party defendant, and, further,
upon the ground that the testimony of plaintiff shows
conclusively that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a mat ter of law. (R. 78, 79).
The motion of third-party defendant Leo Bonneru
1

1
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.
was granted by the trial court on the 8th day of March,
1951. (R. 20, 79, 80).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF IS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT
LEO BONNERU.

POINT III.
ASSUMING THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT LEO BONNERD WAS NEGLIGENT IN SOME MANNER, HIS NEGLIGENCE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.

While it may be apparent that the trial court's
ground for directing a verdict in favor of defendant and
third-party defendant was on the grounds of contributory negligence, it is a matter of general law that the
court on appeal will uphold the verdict of the trial court
if it is sustainable on any ground. See Corpus Juris
Secundum, Par. 1464, Page 72, Vo~ume 5:
"While the appellate court cannot consider
on review questions or grounds of recovery which
are not within the pleadings, evidence, findings,
or issues which were tried and passed on, it may
affirm the judgment where it is correct on any
legal ground or theory disclosed by the record,
regardless of the ground, reason, or theory adopt.ed by the trial court."
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF IS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Defendant, Salt Lake City, has covered the field
quite extensively in respect to the ground of contributory
negligence. For this reason third-party defendant will
not burden the court with additional citations dealing
specifically with facts similar to the case in question.
F·rom the facts as presented in the Statement of
Facts of both plaintiff and defendant, it is apparent that
reasonable minds could not differ as to what an ordinary
prudent person would have done under the circumstances
confronting plaintiff. She was aware of the existence
of the hole in the sidewalk as she had passed by the location numerous times. Upon approaching the hole in
the sidewalk, she did not look or ascertain where she
was stepping and, consequently, ·as a result of her aimless
n1anner in walking upon the sidewalk she. was injured.
It is apparent that she could not have been distracted
to any extent by the approach of the group of children
coming in the opposite direction as none of them had
reached her or had touched her and, by her own testimony, she was not even conscious of the children until
they were three or four feet to the west of her. The
only conclusion that can be drawn, based upon plaintiff's
own statements, is that she was walking or proce·eding
in a thoughtless and purposeless manner and giving little
heed, if any, :to the surrounding conditions. This court
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has, in passing on the grounds of contributory negligence,
held that in such cases the plaintiff's negligence is a
question for the court to determine, and is negligence
as a matter of law.
In the case of OSWALD \T. UTAH LIGHT AND
RAIL,,~_A_Y CO., 39 Utah 245, 250, 252, 117 P. 46, 48, the
court states :
'"When, however, the conduct is such-accepting the general test for want of a better one-that
reasonable minds may not differ as to what a prudent person ordinarily would have done under
the circumstances, and whether the conduct of the
person charged, with negligence came up to that
standard, like one heedlessly walking or driving
in front of a moving car, the court may itself
pronounce the conduct negligence."
·
"Plaintiff's not seeing the flat cars, and not
knowing whether the black object seen by her was
a street car or something else, or whether it was
standing or moving, did not result from such a
mistake or misconception, but from her conduct
in looking in an objectless .and aimless manner,
from her negligent or careless behavior in that
regard. Because of that thoughtless and purposeless manner of looking and of her careless conduct in that regard, the flat cars were not seen
by her, though they were plainly visible and almost in her direct path as she undertook to cross
the track."
In the case of TAYLOR V. BAMBERGER ELECTRIC RAILWAY CO., 62 Utah 552, 564,220 P. 695, 700,
the

COUI'It

said :
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"This court has so often held that it has become elementary that the question of both negligence and contributory negligence are questions
of fact for the jury. It is, therefore, needless to
cite the numerous cases where it is so held. It
has, however, also very often been held by this
court that where there is no conflict in the evidence, and no conflicting inferences are permissible, the question of contributory negligence is
one of law and must be determined by the court.
That is especially the case where, as here, the
whole question turns upon plaintiff's own statements respecting his conduct in the premises,
which conduct constitutes negligence."
Also see Restatement of the Law of T.orts (American Law Institute) Sec. 463-Contributory negligence
defined:
"Contributory negligence is conduct on the
part of the plaintiff, which falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection and which is a legally contributing cause,
co-operating with the negligence of the defendant
in bringing about the plaintiff's harm."
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT
LEO BONNERU.

Plaintiff states at page 4 of her brief: a There is no
dispute concerning the negligence, of both defendants.
Apparently it is conceded that to allow the hole into
which plaintiff stepped to remain along the north edge
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of the cement slab for ouer a year, woHld be negligence
on the part of both defenda1rts.-'' r:rhis state1nent is entirely unfounded and absolutely inconsistent with the
evidence submitted and the motions n1ade by third-party
defendant Leo Bonneru and granted by the trial court.
Aceording to the stipulations agreed to by all parties
concerned, the work which was done pursuant to the
permit issued by Salt Lake City to Leo Bonneru, was
completed on October 9, 1948. Thereafter, on October
21, 1948, the defendant Salt Lake City excavated in the
same area, which included the location of the sewer
excavation made by third-party defendant Leo Bonneru.
There is nothing in the record to show the condition of
the sidewalk at the time third-party defendant completed
whatever work he did; nor is there anything in the record
which would indicate that the sidewalk was not in a
normal condition similar to that of the surrounding sidewalk; nor is there anything in.the record to indicate that
at the time the defendant Salt Lake City excavated this
location, that the sidewalk prior thereto was not in as
perfect and normal condition as the surrounding area.
There has been an utter failure in this regard to show
any evidence that third-party defendant Leo Bonneru
was negligent in any way. It is, therefore, the duty of
this court to sustain the judgment of the lower court.
POINT III.
ASSUMING THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT LEO BONNERD WAS NEGLIGENT IN SOME MANNER, HIS NEGLIGENCE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.
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The defendant Salt Lake City on October 21, 1948,
after third-party defendant's work had been completed,
excavated in the same area which included the location
of the sewer excavation made by third-party defendant.
Assuming that the third-party defendant was in some
n1an!J.er negligent by some prior work which he may have
done, the action of the defendant Salt Lake City in excavating in the same location was an independent, supervening cause, which was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries. Any action on the part of the thirdparty defendant at this location in setting up a negligent
condition would be done away with, altered or changed
to such an extent that third-party defendant's assumed
negligence in this regard could not be considered the
proximate cause or legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries
any more than it can be assumed that the contractor who
originally laid the sidewalk at that point may have left
defective cement work, such as protruding abutments,
cornices, etc. As has been stated in Point II, there is
nothing in the record to indicate the condition of the
sidewalk at the time any work done by third-party defendant was con1pleted, or the condition of the sidewalk
at the ti1ne defendant Salt Lake City began exca:vations.
The only reasonable result which can be arrived at is
that the assumed negligence of third-party defendant
was not the natural or probable cause of plaintiff's injuries. This court has passed on this question in a number of cases. In the case of HANSEN V. CLYDE, 89
Utah 31, 37, 44, 46, 47, 56 P. 2d 1366, 104 A.L.R. 943, the
court states :
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.. If it be assu1ned that negligene~ 'vas alleg·ed
in tern1s against the defendants, then liability
would attach for all the injurious consequences
that reasonably and naturally follow fron1 the
negligence until :such negligence is diverted by
the intervention of son1e efficient cause that
1nakes the new or intervening cause responsible or
that sets in n1otion the negligent force that becon1es the proximate cause of the injury."
Justice Wolfe in his dissenting opinion in the Hansen case, sets up various catagories to be used in the
determination of the question of proximate cause. He
states:
First. Single dynan1ic negligence. rrhe
simple case where one sets in motion a train of
direct· links of cause and effect until the event
or accident is reached. The simplest of these is
where the cause which produces the event is iruInediate with no links between, as where one
drives his car against another with no intermediate links-trespass vi et armis. But, regardless of how mediate or i1nmedia:te the initial
cause may be, if there is a straight succession of
cause and effect leading to the event, it is clearly
a case of proximate cause. Thus where a car runs
against a pole, knocks it down in such a way as
to knock a part from a house which falls and injures a pedestrian. This was still trespass, because the chain was continuous and always in
action. And, if the agencies which transmitted the
initial cause to the final outcome acted spontaneously or automatically, it was still considered as
a succession of inanimate agencies, one acting on
the other. (Squib Case [Scott v. Shepherd], 2
•

H
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W. Bl. 892, 3 Wils. 403), and the form of action
was trespass."
"Seventh. * * * Wherever the action of the
human agent is based on a decision which was
not the quick reaction from, or if it was only remotely or questionably influenced by, the condition met, such action will be considered as starting an independent or supervening or intervening
chain of causation so as to make the "condition
set" not a contributing cause. Thus in the case
of Smith v. Locke Coal Co., 265 Mass. 524, 164
N.E. 381, 61 AI_jR 1052, where a coal chute extending fro1n the wagon across the sidewalk influenced a pedestrian to divert his course around
the wagon into the street where he slipped on ice.
The negligence of the coal company in viola:ting
the city ordinance was not a contributing cause;
the new course of the pedestrian starting a new
and distinct chain of causation."
In FARRELL V. CAMERON, 98 Utah 68, 84, 94 P.
2d 1068, 1075, the court states :
"Proximate cause is that cause which in natural or continued sequence, unbroken by any new,
intervening, efficient cause, produced the result
complained of, and without which the damage
would not have been sustained."
In the case of KAW AGICHI V. BENNETT, 189 P.
2d 109, 111, the following was said:
"There can be no doubt that Instruction No.
7, as given by the court, correctly states the law
as to what is a 'proximate cause.' Rollow v.
Ogden City, 66 U 475, 243· P. 791. We do not
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understand appellant to say that this instruction
is erroneous as a general proposition, but that
under the facts of this case it \vas prejudicial to
give such an instruction since the accident involved children and as a Inatter of law, if the
respondent was negligent, his negligence was the
proxi1nate cause of the injury and there co1.tld be
no question of an intervening cause unless sttch
cause was not reasonably foreseeable. We are not
prepared to say that if respondent was negligent
that under the facts of this case his negligence
as a matter of law was the proximate cause of the
injury and was not a question of fact to be submitted to the jury. The appellant cites the case
of Cahill v. E. B. & A. L. Stone Co. et al., 167 Cal.
126, 138 P. 712, as authority for this proposition.
This case is based on the 'turntable' or 'attractive nuisance' doctrine, wherein the courts have
held that where an instrumentality which .may he
dangerous and attractive to children is left "\vhere
such children are likely to use it, and injury results therefrom, that the negligence of the owner
of the instrumentality is the proximate cause of
any such injury despite the fact that such injury
would not have resulted but for the action of children setting the instrumentality in action, as
such action by children could be reasonably fore.;.
seen. In the instant case, the 'attractive nuisance' doctrine cannot possibly have any application."
It is unreasonable to conclude that third-party defendant Leo Bonneru must foresee and be expected to
guard against a subsequent negligent act of defendant
Salt Lake City any more than the original contractor
who laid the entire sidewalk would be expected to foreSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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see and guard against the negligent excavations of de . .
fendant Salt Lake City.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it is asserted that plaintiff's careless
and aimless manner in proceeding along the sidewalk
constitutes negligence as a matter of law and precludes
plaintiff's recovery. Furthermore, there is no evidence
in the record to show wherein third-party defendant
was negligent. Even assuming third-party defendant
was negligent in some manner, such negligence could
under no circumstances be considered the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries.
Judgment for third-party defendant should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
McCULLOUGH, BOYCE &
McCULLOUGH
Attorneys for Respondent
417 Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
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Attorneys for Plaintiff and· Appellant,
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Salt Lake City.
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